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Collapse of Real Estate Markets
Donald D. Hester*
This paper focuses on how financial institutions function in an
imperfectly competitive market, one that is repeatedly shocked by
financial innovations and governmental interventions and is always in
disequilibrium. It does not consider whether or not financial institutions
caused the collapse of real estate markets, but instead offers reasons
why major lenders moved in the mortgage markets as they did.
The paper is concerned primarily with real estate lending and
financial institutions in the 1980s. However, a long history preceded
the recent real estate collapse and, as in a Greek tragedy, the hubris of
the principals probably made the collapse inevitable. Plenty of signals
were given that could have triggered actions by managers and regula-
tors, but neither were likely to act in the political context of the 1970s
and 1980s.
The first section of the paper summarizes the turbulent history of
mortgage markets that led up to the most recent decade. The next
section describes the actions of the three principal private sector finan-
cial intermediaries in mortgage markets. Then a number of arguments
are reviewed that may account for the actions of these intermediaries.
The following section considers the signals that warned of trouble in
mortgage markets and suggests scenarios for resolving the current
crisis. A final section offers conclusions.
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Background of the Crisis
It is useful to recall that throughout this century real estate markets
have been financed by three major intermediaries, life insurance com-
panies, commercial banks, and savings institutions. An early study by
Morton (1947) documented that the home mortgage lending terms
offered by commercial banks and life insurance companies were strongly
affected by reforms and federal programs enacted in 1934. Maturities of
new home mortgage loans doubled and loan-to-value ratios of new
mortgage loans increased rapidly. Similar but less dramatic changes
were evident in loans booked by savings and loan associations. These
changes persisted into the post-World War II era, and indeed received
further impetus from Veterans Administration (VA) and Federal Hous-
ing Administration (FHA) programs that resulted in even longer mort-
gage maturities and higher loan-to-value ratios.
Real estate loans on multifamily and nonresidential properties are
made principally by life insurance companies and commercial banks,
with insurance companies specializing in long-term loans and banks in
short-term loans. A study by Fiedler (1971) reports that both loan-to-
value ratios and maturities on new loans increased irregularly, begin-
ning in about 1936, and were higher in the immediate postwar period
than in the 1920s. For insurance companies, both series trended up
steadily between 1951 and 1968. While no comparable data are available
for commercial banks, it is likely that they too liberalized commercial
mortgage lending during the prosperous postwar era, which came to a
close in the early 1960s.
The competitive struggle for market shares of deposits between
commercial banks and thrift institutions quickened in the early 1960s
(Hester 1981). Until about 1962, commercial banks had allowed savings
and loan associations to increase their share of the consumer deposit
market, by not matching the interest rates that savings and loans paid.
Once savings and loan associations" share in local markets passed a
certain threshold, however, an optimal policy for commercial banks was
to match the rates paid by savings and loan associations. This resulted
in rapidly rising interest rates on deposits.
To cover the higher cost of deposits, all institutions began to shift
their portfolios toward mortgage loans, which at the time had the
highest net rates of return. Both commercial banks and mutual savings
banks increased their mortgage lending in the early 1960s, at a time
when mortgage loan interest rates were falling relative to interest rates
on other available assets (Hester and Pierce 1975). Rates on mortgage
loans were falling in part because of this increased demand by lenders
for mortgage loans. Profits of savings and loan associations declined
rapidly because of this competitive struggle and also because they had a116 Donald D. Hester
large negative "gap"--that is, for short and medium time horizons their
fixed-rate liabilities were much smaller than their fixed-rate assets.
In 1966 the Federal Reserve intervened by driving up interest rates
and regulators and Congress were forced to impose binding ceilings on
the rates that banks and thrifts could pay on deposits. This intervention
postponed the crisis and restored the profitability of savings institu-
tions. However, it also spawned a wave of institutional changes and
market innovations that would eventually decimate many of them: in
particular, the privatizing of the Federal National Mortgage Association
(FNMA) in 1968, the introduction of Government National Mortgage
Association (GNMA) pass-through securities in 1968, the establishment
of the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC) in 1970, and
the emergence of money market mutual funds (MMMFs) and negotiable
order of withdrawal (NOW) accounts in 1972. Many other important
innovations would occur in the years to follow, including the establish~
ment of financial instrument futures markets in 1975 and the introduc-
tion of variable interest rate mortgage loan contracts.
Partly because of confusion caused by all these innovations, be-
tween 1970 and late 1978 the Federal Reserve allowed the federal funds
interest rate to fall below the CPI inflation rate. A "bubble" developed in
asset markets (and especially in the price of houses) that led to a
situation where one could borrow at interest rates that were lower than
the rate of increase in house prices, especially after account was taken of
the deductibility of mortgage interest from individual income taxes.1 So
long as lenders could get funds at interest rates lower than those they
could net on mortgage lending, this bubble would persist and both
house owners and intermediaries could prosper. The game was obvi-
ously unsustainable, however, and the housing bubble collapsed
around 1980, helped by the Federal Reserve~especially by its actions on
October 6, 1979 and by the rapid growth of MMMFs.
Commercial mortgage lending was similarly expansively affected by
interest rates during the 1970s, but did not suffer as much of a
convulsion when interest rates rose in 1979. Superficially, it appears that
commercial lenders were insulated from interest rate movements be-
cause they were relatively better immunized and because, in an infla-
1 Between 1970 and 1980 the price of a new house rose from about $35,300 to $90,100;
this corresponds to a continuously compounded annual rate of return of 9.8 percent. A
simple arithmetic average of annual interest rates on new home mortgage loans for the
same period was 9.2 percent. Between 1980 and 1991 the corresponding rates averaged 5.3
percent and 11.3 percent, respectively. The effective cost of borrowing is much lower when
account is taken of the deductibility of mortgage interest. Another indicator of the
instability of the housing market is the ratio of the residential construction implicit price
deflator to the overall GDP deflator. With 1987 as a base, this ratio rose from 0.895 in 1970
to a peak of 1.043 in 1980 and then fell to 0.953 in 1991. Construction prices rose and fell
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tionary environment, borrowers could afford to pay high rates out of
steadily rising nominal revenues. Multifamily residential mortgage
lending was less strongly affected by the structure of interest rates and
other changes, for a variety of reasons that are outside the scope of this
paper.
Mortgage Markets in the Past Twelve Years
From this stormy history ensued a vast transformation of financial
markets, and especially mortgage markets. Three major regulatory
reform acts, the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act of 1980, the Garn-St Germain Act of 1982, and the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA),
transformed the ground rules. Three major tax laws, the Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA), the Tax Equalization and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), and the Tax Reform Act of 1986,
drastically altered tax formulas.
This section briefly describes how mortgage markets fared and how
the three principal lenders responded to this turbulent environment.
Table i indicates that these lenders did not maintain their market shares
of one- to four-family residential mortgage loans in the 1980s.2 Mortgage
pools (which in this paper have been defined to include mortgages held
by sponsored credit agencies) increasingly dominated the residential
mortgage markets. The competition from federally sponsored interme-
diaries reduced the demand for the services of private intermediaries,
and thus tended to reduce profits. Although savings and loan associa-
tions and savings banks had been savaged by rising interest rates at the
beginning of the decade, they attempted to expand their lending rapidly
during the first half of the decade, apparently believing that they could
offset their enormous book losses through growth and expansion in a
newly deregulated environment.3 This would prove to be a serious
miscalculation.
Commercial banks steadily increased their residential mortgage
lending throughout the decade, and continue to do so. Several expla-
2 This table and the others in this section have been constructed from the Flow of
Funds Accounts and National Balance Sheets published by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System. The tables emphasize lending activities by the three principal
intermediaries, banks, savings institutions (thrifts), and life insurance companies. Other
suppliers of mortgage loans in the Flow of Funds Accounts include households, a number
of other insurance industries, governments, nonfinancial corporations, retirement and
pension funds, finance companies, and the like.
3 The response of the savings and loan business to deregulation and Reagan
Administration budgetary cutbacks in regulation is described colorfully and in some detail
by Strunk and Case (1988).118 Donald D. Hester
Table 1
Year-End Holdings of Mortgages on Qne- to Four-Family Housing
Life Life
Insurance Insurance
Year Total Pools Banks Thrifts Cos. Pools Banks Thrifts Cos,
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 3/2 4/2 5/2    6/2
Billions of Dollars Percent of Total
1966 232 5 33 132 30 2.1 14,2 57.2 13.0
1967 245 7 35 139 30 2,7 14,4 56,9 12.2
1968 262 9 39 148 29 3.3 14.8 56.5 11.1
1969 280 13 41 157 28 4.5 14,8 56.2 9.9
1970 294 19 42 165 27 6,3 14.4 56.0 9.1
1971 321 25 48 181 25 7.8 15.0 56,4 7.7
1972 360 31 57 207 22 8,6 15.8 57.6 6.2
1973 403 38 68 233 20 9.3 16,9 57.7 5.1
1974 441 46 75 249 19 10.5 17,0 56,4 4.3
1975 482 56 77 271 18 11,7 16,0 56.2 3.7
1976 546 69 86 310 16 12,6 15,8 56.7 2,9
1977 643 85 105 362 15 13.2 16.4 56.3 2.3
1978 754 106 129 412 14 14.1 17.1 54.7 1.9
1979 871 139 150 455 16 15.9 17.2 52.3 1.8
1980 965 165 160 483 18 17.1 16.6 50,1 1,9
1981 1040 189 170 499 17 18.2 16.4 48,0 1.7
1982 1080 249 174 461 17 23.0 16,1 42.7 1.6
1983 1200 323 183 490 15 26.9 15.2 40,9 1,3
1984 1336 378 197 540 14 28,3 14,7 40.4 1.1
1985 1490 468 214 574 12 31.4 14.3 38.5 .8
1986 1721 623 240 588 13 36.2 13.9 34.1 .7
1987 1943 757 280 630 13 39.0 14.4 32,4 .7
1988 2174 836 317 717 15 38,5 14.6 33.0 .7
1989 2404 966 372 717 14 40.2 15.5 29.8 .6
1990 2765 1118 461 672 13 40,4 16,7 24,3 ,5
1991 2905 1271 492 614 12 43.7 16.9 21.1 .4
Source: Board of Governors ofthe Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds Accounts, Assets and
L~bilities, variousissues.
nations for this activity are considered in the next section. Banks also
greatly increased their holdings of agency securities, which include
mortgage pools. As a percentage of net financial assets, banks had about
2 percent in agency securities at the end of 1966 and about 10 percent at
the end of 1991. This discussion will be confined to considering directly
held mortgage loans, and thus it will understate the involvement of
commercial banks in real estate. No information was available about the
fraction of banks’ holdings of agency securities that are financing real
estate indirectly.
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four-family residential market. This withdrawal may be a response to
the changing nature of life insurance company liabilities over the past
quarter century. At the end of 1966, 69 percent of their liabilities were
life insurance reserves and 20 percent were pension fund reserves. At
the end of 1991, 28 percent were reserves for life insurance and 62
percent were reserves for pension funds. Like banks, life insurance
companies have greatly increased the fraction of their portfolios in-
vested in agency securities, even though their holdings of residential
mortgage loans have decreased. At the end of 1991, about 10 percent of
financial assets of life insurance companies were in agency securities.
Because of data limitations, however, this discussion also will be con-
fined to mortgage loans directly held in insurance company portfolios.
Table 2 provides comparable information for commercial mort-
gages. Commercial banks have come to dominate the market. The share
of commercial mortgages held by life insurance companies has been
relatively constant over the past 25 years, and since 1985 thrifts have
been rapidly withdrawing from this market.
Table 3 reports the fraction of total financial assets that each of these
three intermediaries has allocated to one- to four-family residential
mortgages and to commercial mortgages. Commercial banks have
steadily and increasingly shifted their portfolios toward both types of
mortgage loans. Thrifts and life insurance companies have been shifting
away from one- to four-family mortgages. The share of the thrifts’
portfolio in commercial mortgages has been essentially trendless over
the past 25 years. Life insurance companies increased the share of their
portfolio going to commercial mortgages until about 1980; since then the
share has drifted down slightly.
Perhaps it is fair to conclude that thrifts and life insurance compa-
nies were rather passively responding to the turbulent 1980s, whereas
commercial banks were aggressively increasing both market share and
the share of their portfolios going into mortgage loans.
Explanations for Changing Mortgage
Lending by Intermediaries
This section reviews some hypotheses that partly explain mortgage
market activity by thrifts, commercial banks, and life insurance compa-
nies. Before focusing on mortgage lending, it is important to emphasize
that the 1980s were a period of gross macroeconomic disequilibrium.
The ratio of total credit market debt owed by nonfinancial sectors to
gross domestic product, relatively unchanging over much of the post-
war period, rose sharply from 1.45 in 1980 to 1.97 in 1991. It is against
the background of this borrowing binge by all sectors of the economy
that the explosion in mortgage lending must be considered.120 Donald D. Hester
Table 2
Year-End Holdings of Commercial Mortgages
Life Life
Insurance Insurance
Year Total Banks Thrifts Cos. Banks Thrifts     Cos,
(1) (2) (3)    (4) (5) 3/2    4/2     5/2
(Billions of Dollars) (Percent of Total)
1966 61 16 13 19 26,8 21,9 30.7
1967 66 18 15 21 27.2 22.3 31,2
1968 73 21 17 22 28,3 22,9 30,9
1969 78 22 18 24 28,2 22,8 31.1
1970 86 23 19 26 27,2 22.7 30.4
1971 96 26 24 29 27.4 24.9 29.7
1972 113 32 29 32 28,2 25.8 28.0
1973 132 39 34 37 29.4 25.7 27.7
1974 147 44 37 41 29.7 25.3 28.1
1975 159 47 43 45 29.4 26,7 28.4
1976 171 50 48 49 29,4 28.1 28,6
1977 190 57 53 54 30.0 27,9 28.7
1978 212 66 57 62 31,2 26.7 29.4
1979 236 76 60 71 32.2 25,3 30.0
1980 256 81 62 81 31.6 24.1 31,6
1981 278 91 64 88 32,6 22,9 31.8
1982 301 103 66 94 34.1 22.0 31.1
1983 352 120 83 104 34.2 23.5 29,5
1984 418 153 104 111 36.6 24.8 26.6
1985 480 181 114 128 37.7 23.8 26.6
1986 553 223 119 149 40,3 21.6 27.0
1987 651 267 147 167 41.1 22,6 25.6
1988 699 305 139 184 43.7 19.8 26.4
1989 745 340 137 195 45,7 18.3 26.1
1990 756 336 109 215 44.5 14,4 28.4
1991 751 336 87 218 44.7 11.6 29.1
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds Accounts, Assets and
Liabilities, various issues.
Thrifts
The response of thrifts was essentially dictated by the crisis precip-
itated by soaring market interest rates at the start of the decade. If assets
were marked to market values in the early 1980s, the two largest groups
of thrift intermediaries, savings and loan associations and mutual
savings banks, had massively negative net worth. The only "quick fix"
would have been a very substantial early reduction in nominal interest
rates, followed by reforms that allowed them to eliminate their negative
gap. Interest rates did not fall sufficiently and, as has been documentedFINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE COLLAPSE OF REAL ESTATE MARKETS 121
Table 3
Percentage of Total Financial Assets Held as Mortgage Loans by Commercial
Banks, Thrifts, and Life Insurance Companies





























Source: Board of Governors
L~bilities, various issues.
1-4 1-4
Commercial Family Commercial Family
4.5 64.8 6.6 18.6
4.4 63.5 6.7 17.3
4.6 63.2 7.1 15.8
4.7 63.6 7.2 14.4
4.5 61.7 7.3 13.3
4.6 58.6 7,8 11.4
4.8 57.8 8.1 9.6
5.1 58.7 8.6 8.3
5.2 57.7 8.6 7.4
5.3 55.2 8.7 6.3
5.2 54,9 8.5 5.2
5.3 55.6 8.1 4.3
5.4 56.3 7.7 3.8
5.6 57.2 7.5 3.8
5.4 56.2 7.2 3.9
5.6 55.5 7.1 3.4
5.9 48,4 7.0 3.0
6.4 44.3 7.5 2.4
7.2 41.9 8.0 2.0
7.6 40.7 8.1 1.6
8.5 38.2 7,8 1.4
9.6 37.4 8.7 1.3
10.3 39.0 7.6 1.4
10.5 41.7 7.9 1.1
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ofthe Federal Reserve System. Flowof~n~ Account, Asse~and
by a very large number of books, savings and loan institutions and
savings banks responded in other ways to this crisis.4 A responsible
review of this extensive and contentious literature is beyond the scope of
this paper.
As shown in Table 1, thrifts briefly reduced their holding of
mortgage loans in 1981, after net deposit inflows fell to a trickle. As
inflows of deposits (often brokered) and other funds increased in
4 Compare Barth (1991); Brumbaugh (1988); Kane (1989); Strunk and Case (1988).122 Donald D. Hester
subsequent years, thrifts expanded mortgage lending relatively rapidly
until 1989, when a sharp decline began.5
Net income was negative in 1981 and 1982 for savings institutions
insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC).6
It was positive between 1983 and 1986, and massively negative thereaf-
ter. Savings banks insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion (FDIC) had operating losses in 1980, 1981, 1982, and again recently.
The more recent string of losses led to the passage of FIRREA in 1989.
A simple reconstruction of events shows that regulators allowed
mortgage lending by the thrift intermediaries to grow, so long as profits
were positive. In principle, such a policy could succeed, if profits were
sufficiently high to permit net worth to quickly reach a reasonable level
relative to liabilities. However, the policy was a pipe dream at best,
because net income ~as much too low.
A more accurate, messy, and comprehensive story is available in
the volumes cited in footnote 4 and in many others. A cursory reading
of this literature leads to the conclusion that regulators, politicians, and
many other individuals misunderstood the severity of the crisis and
witlessly believed the rhetoric of the Reagan years, that deregulation
and the unleashing of animal instincts would cure all. That, we can all
agree now, was irresponsible, as should have been obvious at the time.
Commercial Banks
Commercial banks, like thrifts, are depository institutions. Some of
the following discussion would also pertain, with the necessary
changes, to a thrift institution with positive net worth. Three explana-
tions are proposed to account for the observed rapidly rising share of
mortgage loans in bank portfolios.
Explanation one. Mortgage loans have become less risky for banks to
hold because the exposure of loan asset values to interest rate changes
can now be controlled much better, using financial innovations such as
variable rate mortgage loans, swaps, financial instrument options and
futures markets, stripped securities, and the like.
Before 1975, when a bank acquired a new residential mortgage loan,
it could expect to hold it for perhaps eight to twelve years. If interest
rates rose, it would sustain an unrealized capital loss. If interest rates
s This discussion refers to thrifts, rather than their constituent components, savings
and loan associations, savings banks, and the like, because considerable shifting of
institutions across intermediary types occurred as the crisis bloomed. Information about
thrift deposits and earnings is taken from the 1988 Savings Institutions Sourcebook, published
by the United States League of Savings Institutions.
6 Net income is defined as gross operating income less operating expenses, interest on
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remained at the higher level over the life of a loan, the bank would
sustain an opportunity cost loss. Since 1980, through judicious use of
any of the above innovations, a bank has been able to reduce or even
eliminate such risk exposure. Therefore, other things being equal, a
mortgage loan is less risky and more attractive to risk-averse bankers.
Because the dating of the innovations is reasonably clear, ratios of real
estate loans to total assets between 1960 and 1990 can be interpreted as
providing some rough empirical support for this hypothesis. Beginning
in 1960, at five-year intervals, real estate loans were successively 11, 13,
13, 13, 17, 18, and 26 percent of total domestic banking system assets.
Explanation two. Changes in the tax deductibility of interest ex-
penses created a niche for mortgage lending, so that borrowers would
channel borrowing for all purposes through mortgages and thus sub-.
stantially increase the demand for mortgage loans from banks and other
lenders.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 drastically reduced the extent to which
individuals could deduct interest from income when preparing federal
income tax documents. This reform was phased in over five years.
Individuals could exploit the fungibility of loans by borrowing with a
residential mortgage and using the proceeds for any activity. The
incentive to borrow with mortgages rose between 1986 and 1991 as the
fraction of other interest that could be deducted fell from 100 percent to
zero. The amount of such fungibility is difficult to measure, because it
can be effected through first mortgage loans taken out for renovation,
refinancing of existing loans, second mortgage loans, and home equity
lines of credit. In 1991 about 1.9 percent of banking system assets were
reported to be mortgage loans that originated from home equity lines of
credit, and about 16 percent of all one- to four-family mortgage loans
from banks were in the form of home equity lines of credit (Brunner,
Hancock, and McLaughlin 1992, p. 474). The sharp increase in one- to
four-family mortgage lending by banks after 1986 (Tables 1 and 3)
suggests that tax law changes were quite important. The niche created
by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 is not easily exploited by providers of
mortgage pools, because loan contracts that arise from home equity lines
of credit or that allow flexible restructuring would be difficult to price
and market.
Explanation two does not explain the growth in commercial mort-
gage loans made by banks. Demand for commercial mortgages by
individuals should have decreased because of the Tax Reform Act’s
more restrictive treatment of passive investments.
Explanation three. Changes in the loan markets served by banks
made it likely that banks could expect greater profits if they increased
the fraction of their loan portfolios in real estate loans.
This argument is difficult to present, because bankers rarely an-
nounce what rates of return they realize and no sane investors divulge124 Donald D. Hester
information having value that can be appropriated by others. However,
the ongoing collapse of savings and loan associations and savings banks
surely enhanced the profitability of mortgage lending for commercial
banks, in both the short and the long run. The number and strength of
rivals have fallen sharply.
Further, as explanation two implies, the demand for conventional
consumer loans must have fallen relative to the demand for real estate
loans, because interest on consumer loans was becoming less deduct-
ible. Growing securitization also led to a decline in the stock of
consumer loans on commercial bank balance sheets, although not
necessarily to less bank activity in originating consumer credit. By
securitizing credit card debt, banks can increase the ratio of their net
worth to risk assets and their return on equity. The controversial
proposition by Ausubel (1991) that credit card debt is very profitable,
thus, does not imply that bank holdings of consumer debt should be
large or rising.
Also in the 1980s, as has been forcefully argued by McCauley and
Seth (1992), foreign bank commercial and industrial (C&I) loans to
nonbanks in the United States have been rising rapidly. They report that
a reserve requirement differential gave foreign banks a 25-basis-point
advantage until the end of 1990, when the differential was removed.
They estimate that between 1983 and 1990 the share of all C&I loans in
the United States from foreign banks rose from 18 percent to 41 percent,
and that the share had risen further to 45 percent by the end of 1991.
McCauley and Seth provided a number of reasons, including low-cost
capital and "regulatory arbitrage," for believing that the foreign share
will continue to increase.
In addition, commercial paper, a close substitute for some C&I
loans, grew very rapidly through 1990. Also, partly because of outbasing
in maquiladoras enterprises and the adoption of "just-in-time" technolo-
gies, inventories in U.S. enterprises have been falling relative to GDP
and national wealth. Because of the close relationship between inven-
tory levels and C&I loan changes at U.S. banks, a continuing decline in
the demand for C&I loans seems likely.7
The strong positive slope of the yield curve at present provides an
additional reason for believing that banks will be expanding the fraction
of their portfolios placed in mortgage loans. Banks can make either
fixed-rate or adjustable-rate mortgages and, as noted above, do swaps to
control their gaps.
Banks’ net income as a fraction of their average outstanding assets
has been trending down since the early 1960s. For all insured banks, this
ratio has been much lower in the past five years than it was in the first
These arguments are developed in Hester (1992).HNANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE COLLAPSE OF REAL ESTATE MARKETS 125
half of the 1980s. These trends reflect the growing competition that
banks have been experiencing in various loan and deposit markets, from
rivals both in the United States and abroad. Demand for conventional
consumer and C&I loans from U.S. banks is likely to continue to fall.
While the competition from mortgage pools has been serious and
intensifying, the best and brightest hope for loans in bank portfolios in
terms of rate of return may still be in real estate.
Life Insurance Companies
The restructuring of life insurance company activity, from princi-
pally providing life insurance to managing pension funds, is likely to
have considerably changed how insurance companies view mortgage
loans. Life insurance contracts require that payments be funded at the
time of the insured’s demise. If premiums are sufficient and portfolios
adequately immunized against future interest rate fluctuations, a stock
chartered company can be expected to allocate excess funds to maximize
its surplus.8 Managing pension fund portfolios differs in that payouts
are spread over time and the number of beneficiaries changes and
cannot be fully controlled by a fund manager. Clearly, differences exist
among pension funds, and they may also have restrictions on assets that
can be held in the different portfolios.
Life insurance company portfolios cannot be decomposed in the
Flow of Funds Accounts to reflect their life insurance and pension fund
roles. The assets that have grown most in percentage terms in life
insurance company portfolios over the past decade are (in descending
order) mutual fund shares, money market fund shares, U.S. agency
securities, U.S. Treasury securities, miscellaneous assets, open market
paper, and corporate and foreign bonds.9 It would appear that, for
prudential or regulatory reasons, life insurance companies have been
shifting into highly liquid and relatively safe assets. This shift away
from mortgages and equities appears to be a consequence of the
changing structure of life insurance company liabilities. It also reflects
shifts in the public’s demand for coverage from straight-life to term
insurance.
8 It is never clear what mutually chartered insurance firms attempt to maximize, but
that question is beyond the scope of this paper.
9 The percentage changes were calculated from the end of 1979 through the end of
1991, using the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds Accounts, Financial Assets and Liabilities, June
11, 1992. All of the assets reported in the text, except corporate and foreign bonds, had a
higher percentage rate of growth than total financial assets of life insurance companies
over this period.126 Donald D. Hester
Problems in Real Estate Markets and
Scenarios for Resolution
The preceding sections have argued that thrift institutions and life
insurance companies have been rather passive participants in mortgage
markets while commercial banks were actively trying to expand. The
explanations offered for the banks’ expansion efforts are based on
changing technology and market conditions; rates of return in mortgage
markets looked relatively more attractive, at least in the short and
medium term. The other two intermediaries are represented as guided
by structural considerations that were externally imposed.
This section relies on additional information that has become
increasingly accessible over the past decade. First, it briefly considers a
proposition about the relation of demographic changes to housing
prices and their relation to defaults. Second, it reports that commer-
cial real estate markets have been deteriorating for many years. Third,
it presents and interprets a chart suggesting a substantial deteriora-
tion in the U.S. economy, which should have alerted lenders and
regulators that commercial mortgage borrowers would have trouble
meeting their obligations. Finally, it suggests a few scenarios for
resolving the crisis.
One- to Four-Family Mortgages
It is important to address first a proposition about housing markets
that was raised in a paper by Mankiw and Weil (1989) and recently has
been discussed by Garner (1992). Briefly, Mankiw and Weil argue that,
with the passing of the crest of the baby boom generation beyond the
ages when individuals traditionally first buy a house, it is likely that the
demand for houses will decline dramatically. They project that this will
culminate in a glut of housing and a sharp decline in housing prices.
Garner does not question the demographic facts, but does claim that the
decline in housing prices is likely to be modest because of an elastic
supply of new houses, growing real incomes, and a rising incidence of
single-adult households. Space does not allow a full discussion of the
arguments, but the financial implications of a collapse in housing prices
must be explored.
Would a decline in housing prices imply an increased rate of default
and additional losses for lenders? The answer of course depends on the
amount of leverage, which is a function of the ratio of the balance on a
mortgage loan secured by a property to the market value of the
property. In the past decade, the loan-to-price ratio for new loans on
primary mortgage markets has varied procyclically between 72 and 81
percent; in April 1992, it was 76.9 percent. Most mortgages have been
outstanding for some years, so some principal has been retired. In someFINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE COLLAPSE OF REAL ESTATE MARKETS 127
Table 4
Annual Rates of Return and Vacancy Rates on Commercial Properties,
Nationwide
NCREIF Property
Rate of Return Indicesa
Coldwell Banker Vacancy
Rate Indicesb
Annual Rates of Return Downtown
Commercial
Year Total Income Capital Office Industrial
1979 17.1 8.8 7.8 5.2 2.7
1980 22.7 8.9 13.0 3.4 3.5
1981 15.2 8.3 6.5 3.8 3.8
1982 16.3 8.0 7.9 5,5 3.8
1983 8.6 8.0 .6 10.8 4.8
1984 14.8 7.5 6.9 13.1 4.8
1985 11.8 7.4 4.2 15.4 4.8
1986 9.7 7.5 2.0 16.5 5.3
1987 6.2 7.2 -.9 16.3 5.9
1988 5.4 7.0 -1.5 16.3 5.8
1989 6.9 7.0 -,1 16.1 6.0
1990 5.5 6.6 -1.0 16.7 6.5
1991 .1 6.7 -6.3 17.4 7.5
1992 -5.8 7.0 -12.1 18.8 8.6
aSource: Reproduced with permission of National Council of Real Estate Investment Fiduciaries.
(Copyright 1992 by NCREIF and Frank Russell Company, Tacoma, WA. All rights reserved.) Data are for
years ending March 31.
b Source: CB Commercial Real Estate Group, Inc. The values of the indices are for March in each year.
parts of the country, however, housing prices have fallen faster than
loans are being amortized.
While the possibility of a collapse cannot be ruled out, it is my view
that leverage has been sufficiently controlled that such an event is very
unlikely. Whatever danger exists comes more from a failing U.S.
economy than from demographic wiggles. And if a collapse did occur,
the outcome would be strongly affected by the actions of mortgage pool
managers and their regulators.
Commercial Mortgages
Table 4 provides information about the ex post rate of return from
investments in commercial properties and about vacancy rates of com-
mercial and industrial structures. The National Council of Real Estate
Investment Fiduciaries (NCREIF) collects data from a group of institu-
tional investors on the rates of return they earn from their properties.
The survey began in 1977; its scope and the number of reporting
investors have increased over time. The aggregate value of property
underlying the series was about $600 million in 1977 and $22 billion in128 Donald D. Hester
early 1992; properties are located throughout the United States, but this
is not a random sample.10
The three rates of return for commercial property reported in the
table are the overall RusselI-NCREIF property index (labeled "total")
and two components. The "income" rate is calculated by dividing net
operating income by the value of the properties. The "capital" rate of
return is the percentage change in property market values. As is evident
from Table 4, both component rates have been trending down. The
capital rate of return has been negative for the past six years and has
plunged recently. Capital rates of return in 1991 were uniformly nega-
tive across regions and types of properties. Clearly conditions in
commercial real estate have been deteriorating for some time.
The last two columns in Table 4 report national vacancy rates for
commercial and industrial properties, published quarterly by CB Com-
mercial Real Estate Group, Inc.11 The rates pertain to the first quarter of
the year. Both vacancy rate series have positive trends and have roughly
tripled between 1979 and 1991. The rise has been remarkably steady
over those 13 years, although each rate had a temporary pause around
1988.
Real commercial construction spending peaked at the end of 1985.
Between 1986 and 1989 it was roughly constant at $70 billion (1987
dollars), and then it began to fall steadily. The puzzle is why it remained
as high as it did and why commercial banks would increase their
commercial mortgage lending in such conditions.
One possible explanation for the anomaly is that information is
being lost when vacancies are aggregated from regional to national
markets. Banks and contractors may have been lending and building in
expanding regions of the country, while vacancies and declining returns
were occurring in other regions. If this were happening, vacancy rates in
different cities should not be highly positively correlated. This study
developed a correlation matrix of commercial vacancy rates for the 15
cities that had been in the Coldwell Banker Series since its inception in
1978. There were 56 quarterly observations for each city. Specifically, the
10 The Russell-NCREIF Property Index is designed to describe the performance of
unleveraged properties that are owned by pension funds and profit-sharing plans.
Properties in the index have been operational for at least one year or have 80 percent
occupancy and are held in a fiduciary setting where they are periodically revalued.
Properties include offices, warehouses, hotels, retail establishments, and apartments.
~1 The commercial index refers to properties in downtown areas and is the percentage
of vacant square feet in the total square footage of a set of "major competitive multi-tenant
office buildings." The national downtown series is reported rather than the suburban or
metropolitan series because it is longer. In recent quarters, vacancy rates for suburbs and
metropolitan areas are higher than for downtown areas. The industrial index is generated
from a survey of industrial properties that could accommodate a tenant requiring at least
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principal components were calculated for this 15 x 15 matrix in order to
determine the extent to which vacancy rates in different cities moved
together. The largest principal component accounted for 72 percent of
the generalized variance and had positive loadings for all cities. All but
four cities had correlations with the largest component that exceeded
0.90.12 Percentages of the generalized variance that were accounted for
by the next four largest components were 14, 7, 3, and 2 percent
respectively. This suggests strongly that no serious aggregation problem
is confounding the interpretation of movements in the national index of
commercial vacancy rates.
Commercial real estate lending by life insurance companies was
somewhat responsive to the deteriorating market conditions. The frac-
tion of insurance company portfolios in commercial mortgages declined
in the 1980s, but too slowly with the benefit of hindsight. Life insurance
commitments for income property loans shot up from $5 billion to $21
billion between 1982 and 1985, and then remained roughly unchanged
through 1989, the latest date for which information is available.13 The
loan-to-value ratio for commercial loans fell in 1982 from 73 to 70
percent, and stayed at the lower value until 1989, so life insurance
companies appeared to be a little better secured by property values in
the 1980s than they. were in the 1970s. Nevertheless, there can be little
doubt that the profitability of life insurance companies has been declin-
ing over the past decade, in part because of losses on real estate.
The puzzle remains about why banks were increasing their com-
mercial real estate lending. One possible explanation is that banks were
looking at different information from that presented in Table 4. For
example, since the fourth quarter of 1985 the National Real Estate Index
has published semiannual information on price per square foot, rent per
square foot, and a capitalization rate for commercial buildings, including
offices, warehouses, retail buildings, and apartments. These national
indexes were relatively unchanging between 1985 and 1990. Alterna-
tively, perhaps real estate lending was simply the most promising
activity for banks in a generally dour national economy.
~2 The cities are Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, Denver, Houston, Kansas City, Los
Angeles, Miami, Minneapolis, Phoenix, Sacramento, San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle,
and Washington. Those that had correlations of less than 0.9 with the largest component
were Atlanta, Kansas City, Sacramento, and San Diego.
~3 The survey, conducted by the American Council of Life Insurance, is of 21 life
insurance companies that control 61 percent of industry assets. The source here is the
Federal Reserve Board’s Annual Statistical Digest, various issues.130 Donald D. Hester
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Trends in the National Economy
The U.S. economy has been performing poorly in the last decade in
several dimensions. When an economy unexpectedly underperforms,
perhaps it should be no surprise that real estate markets and their
long-term financiers suffer. Space does not allow a thorough analysis of
this unfortunate experience, but several indicators are suggestive. The
poor performance of the economy can be attributed to five widely
recognized phenomena: large federal government deficits, the federal-
izing of mortgage markets through sponsored pools, a low saving rate,
a global decline in the rate of technical progress, and rapid growth in the
fraction of the labor force that is inexperienced.
Figure 1 is an attempt to summarize their combined effects in three
indicators, the ratio of nonmortgage debt to mortgage debt in the Flow
of Funds Accounts, the ratio of the stock of nonresidential plant and
equipment to gross domestic product (GDP), and the real hourly wage
rate. The ratio of aggregate private nonmortgage debt to mortgage debt
has trended down; it had a peak value of 1.398 in 1970, a local peak of
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interpretation is that federal mortgage pools and government deficits
were crowding out business borrowing. The ratio’s decline in the late
1980s is particularly remarkable because it coincides with the leveraged-
buyout mania. Crowding out is also indicated by the high real short-
term interest rates throughout the 1980s, relative to other years since
World War II.14 The high real rates also reflect restrictive monetary
policy, the low saving rate, and an associated population bulge in the
age bracket where individuals begin to work and form families, as might
be predicted by a simple life-cycle model. Crowding out should reduce
the rate of commercial and industrial capital formation, if the demand
for such capital is relatively more interest elastic.
The ratio of the stock of nonresidential plant and equipment (at
current cost) to nominal GDP rose steadily from 1966 to 1975. After a
one-year hiatus, the ratio continued to rise until 1982.is Since 1982 the
ratio has declined monotonically. The rate of producer capital formation
increased when short-term real interest rates were low or negative and
fell when they were high. The fact that the onset of the decline in the
ratio coincides with the onset of large federal deficits suggests that
private nonresidential capital formation is being crowded out by large
federal deficits. A declining domestic capital-output ratio in the context
of very low technical progress suggests that individual borrowers’
capacity to service and repay mortgage loans is decreasing. If the decline
was unanticipated, commercial and household mortgage loans should
experience more defaults and more building space will be vacant.
The hourly wage rate in 1982 dollars had a global peak in 1973 of
$8.55 and experienced a local peak in 1978 of $8.40. It was essentially
constant between 1980 and 1988. In the past three years it has fallen
sharply and is currently below its level in 1966. With a declining
capital-output ratio, a rising rate of participation by adults in the labor
market, and slow technical progress, a downtrend in wage rates is
hardly surprising. Since the decline in real wages was unanticipated, it
might be postulated that borrowers would have increasing difficulty
servicing and repaying mortgages, especially home mortgages. Two
reasons why this difficulty has not become more evident are that the
incidence of homeownership by families has been decreasing since
about 1981 (Gabriel 1987, p. 895) and that the participation rate of adults
in the labor market has been rising.
The conclusion to be drawn from this gloomy recitation is that
serious macroeconomic problems have adversely affected markets that
14 The interest rate referred to is the quarterly federal funds rate minus the percentage
change in the GDP deflator, measured as an arc elasticity.
1~ In 1970-71, in 1974-75, in 1980-82, and presumably in 1990-92, this ratio was
positively distorted, because in recessions income falls faster than the book values of
physical assets.132 Donald D. Hester
provide capital services. Some of these problems have been long-
standing, but their cumulative effects may not have been fully appreci-
ated by lenders in mortgage markets.
Alternative Scenarios for Resolution
High vacancy rates in commercial and industrial structures, the
declining rate of return on income properties, and the worsening
macroeconomic situation must be addressed if the condition of mort-
gage lenders is to improve. Quite apart from the macroeconomic
situation, recent Federal Reserve Board staff studies by Passmore (1991)
and by McAllister and McManus (1992) indicate, respectively, that
1) mortgage lending by "efficient" savings and loan associations and
2) aggressive overall lending by banks are not very profitable. The good
name and growing market share of government-sponsored mortgage
pools argue that putting more one- to four-family mortgage loans on the
balance sheets of private intermediaries is a dubious strategy. With a
glut of commercial property, all lenders will be forced into painful
givebacks when restructuring deals with mortgagees who fail to make
payments. The net rate of return from real estate lending in the coming
years cannot be large.
With the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to see that a serious
misallocation of resources occurred when contractors overbuilt offices
and factories. This is a deadweight loss that is and will be borne by the
economy, and its sharing will be contentious. It is the same sort of loss
that accompanied the savings and loan debacle, although it now appears
to be an order of magnitude smaller. Much of the loss in efficiency has
already occurred; its subsequent redistribution is what the various
scenarios at least partly determine.
First, the basic, "non-bailout" scenario is to allow excess capacity,
however misplaced, to be absorbed by a slowly growing economy.
Owners of banks, insurance companies, and other lenders who are
inadequately collateralized have already absorbed a large hit, and more
hits will surely follow. Owners of the properties have paid a price for
their wrong decisions. Individuals who made commitments based on
false signals emitted by the new structures have been penalized.
Government revenues share the losses in proportion to the declines in
corporate or personal income multiplied by the appropriate marginal tax
rates, with obvious implications for public finance.
Second, in the unlikely event that banks and other lenders are
unable to absorb the losses, a bailout might occur that would broaden
the base of losers to the population of taxpayers. The cost could be
staggering, if the soundness of mortgage pools were threatened.
Third, a tax of a different form might be incurred if lenders manage
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trusts that they manage. This is a distinct possibility in thin markets
where prices are determined through negotiation, and unavoidable for
life insurance companies that already manage pension funds. It essen-
tially would be a replay of the real estate investment trust (REIT) fiasco
of the early 1970s. The loss would be absorbed’ through lower revenues
received by beneficiaries for many years into the future.
Fourth, a dose of unafiticipated inflation tends to annihilate nomi-
nal debts and would, of course, lighten the burden of all debtors.
However, the steeply sloped yield curve, in the context of excess
physical capacity, strongly suggests that many investors anticipate
inflation. Inflation has unfortunate time-consistency implications in
capital markets. The loss would be borne not only by holders of debt,
but by future potential borrowers. The incidence of the loss is not easy
to predict in a world of derivative securities and variable rate loans.
Finally, a restructuring of financial markets in response to bad
portfolio management in real estate markets has already resulted in
large, fortuitous gains and losses, based on agility and informational
advantages. The ongoing reduction in the number of financial institu-
tions may improve the profitability of the survivors, and it will continue
to have effects on employment in intermediaries and on quasi-rents in
myriad markets. Efficiency gains may result from this restructuring as
well.
Elements from all these scenarios will be present in the final
resolution.
Conclusion
Thrift institutions, commercial banks, and life insurance companies
continue to hold large amounts of commercial mortgages. While it is too
early for a full accounting, all providers of commercial mortgages almost
surely are absorbing large losses because of the high national vacancy
rates and the recent negative rates of return on real estate.
Thrifts and banks continue to hold large amounts of one- to
four-family mortgage loans. Banks have been rapidly expanding their
holdings, and both banks and life insurance companies have also been
greatly expanding their holdings of agency securities, which are to a
large but unknown extent backed by one- to four-family mortgages as
well.
While the ex ante basis for decisions to invest in mortgage loans
cannot be known, this paper has proposed separate interpretations for
each intermediary. Thrifts made a desperate attempt to grow out of their
dire condition in 1980, which itself was a result of mismanagement and
ill-advised regulatory policies dating from the 1960s. Using brokered
deposits and other funds, thrifts rapidly increased their holdings of both134 Donald D. Hester
one- to four-family and commercial mortgage loans. The attempt had
little chance of success, but because of deregulation and staff cuts in
regulatory agencies it was allowed to continue until 1989, with disas-
trous consequences.
Three explanations for commercial bank mortgage market activity
have been proposed: 1) financial innovations have allowed banks to
reconfigure mortgages to control.gaps; 2) a niche was created by the 1986
Tax Reform Act, which banks were well positioned to exploit; and
3) changes in the market power of rivals drove banks into mortgages.
Banks face very stiff competition from government-sponsored mortgage
pools, but have an advantage in the tax avoidance business because of
the flexibility of home equity lines of credit and their other mortgage
loan instruments. It is not terribly edifying to rationalize banks’ success
in terms of their ability to reduce federal revenues, but that is where
their advantage lies.
Banks’ plunge into commercial mortgage lending has no such
convenient justification. It seems to be another in a long series of
miscalculations by large banks, in the tradition of the REIT mess and
Third World and leveraged-buyout bridge loans. Of course, banks have
had some big successes too, and it is through bearing risk that interme-
diaries serve the public. If they had more capacity to bear risk, we
probably would not be having this conference. The 30-year slow erosion
in the industry’s ratio of net income to assets and the condition of the
FDIC and the Bank Insurance Fund indicate that some major reconstruc-
tive surgery is needed.
The ongoing transformation of life insurance companies from
insurance to pension providers makes them very difficult to model. A
similar transformation is occurring within providers of other types of
insurance. We need a much deeper understanding of all the new
contracts being written, before we can evaluate performances. In my
view we badly need a major national study of the provision of accident,
health, and life insurance and pension services by both the public and
private sectors.FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE COLLAPSE OF REAL ESTATE MARKETS    135
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James R. Barth*
Real estate lending has been disastrous for thousands of financial
institutions during the past decade. Savings and loans, savings banks,
commercial banks, and life insurance companies, in particular, have
suffered from the changing nature of real estate markets and from
collapsing real estate values. Donald Hester documents many of these
developments and provides some explanations for them. Since the
scope of his paper is quite broad, these comments will focus on areas
meriting additional emphasis.
More Competition and Declining Profits
for Depositories
Major and ongoing changes have occurred in the shares of financial
assets held by financial service firms in the United States. In particular,
the share of assets held by all depository institutions has declined, from
65 percent in 1950 to 39 percent in March 1992. U.S.-chartered commer-
cial banks have seen their share fall by 30 percentage points, to 21
percent. Of all the nondepos~tory financial service firms, only the life
insurance companies’ share has declined since 1950, falling by 9 per-
centage points over the entire period to 12 percent.
Among the financial service firms that have experienced expanding
market shares, money market mutual funds and issuers of securitized
credit obligations did not even exist in 1970, yet now account for
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significant shares of financial assets. Mutual funds alone account for a
larger share of financial assets today than savings and loans, savings
banks, and credit unions combined. Substantial growth in share has also
occurred among pension and retirement funds, nonlife insurance com-
panies, and security brokers and dealers.
At the same time that competition among new and old firms to
provide intermediation services has been intensifying, the growth in the
commercial paper market and the expanding securitization process have
left all depositories with fewer lower-risk customers and with depressed
returns on many of their traditional products. These developments
reflect improved informational technologies, a more volatile financial
environment, and limitations on the geographic location of depositories,
their ownership, and their allowed products. Not surprisingly, profits
have eroded while risks have increased, as depositories have struggled
to meet the competition. The struggle has been exacerbated by the ever
higher insurance premiums depositories must pay, and by the destruc-
tive pricing practices of weak and even insolvent depositories that were
able to grow imprudently using subsidized federally insured deposits
and under inadequate regulatory supervision.
On average, access to federally insured deposits no longer provides
depositories with a sufficiently low-cost source of funds to acquire assets
producing the same overall risk-return combinations as in earlier years.
For savings and loans, the average rate of return on assets has steadily
declined throughout the post-World War II period, reaching a negative
30 basis points in the period from 1980 through 1991. Moreover, the
differential between the rate of return on equity and the rate on
longer-term U.S. Treasury securities has declined in every decade. At
the same time, the standard deviations of both the return on assets and
the return on equity of depositories have tended to increase over this
40-year period.
For commercial banks, the return on assets has fallen from 80 basis
points in the 1970s to 62 basis points in the period from 1980 through
1991. The differential of the return on equity over the rate on longer-
term U.S. Treasury securities has declined in each of the past four
decades, turning negative in the most recent period. The standard
deviations of both the return on assets and the return on equity have
increased markedly in the 1980 through 1991 period, while the ratio of
net charge-offs to assets has increased steadily throughout the entire
post-World War II period.
The reported improvement in financial performance for deposito-
ries in the first half of this year largely reflects an extremely steep yield
curve and the gains on sales of assets, and the longer-term deterioration
indicates that the more fundamental problem still remains. I agree with
Donald Hester’s statement that "some major reconstructive surgery is
needed."138 James R. Barth
Depositories" Unpleasant Expansion
into Real Estate Markets
A major shift has occurred in the commitment to real estate lending
among the different depositories. In particular, the share of home
mortgage loans (for one- to four-family homes) accounted for by savings
and loans declined dramatically, from 43 percent in 1980 to only 15
percent in March 1992. Over the same period the share accounted for by
commercial banks was relatively stable at 17 percent. Savings banks’
share declined by nearly 4 percentage points, while credit unions’ share
increased by 1 percentage point; government-sponsored enterprises
now hold the same share as these two types of depositories com-
bined 5 percent. At the same time, the share accounted for by
mortgage pools increased from 11 percent to 39 percent.
The securitization of home mortgages represents a fundamental
change in the economics of home finance. The process has created a
much more liquid market for these mortgages and hence has allowed for
a much wider ownership. The net result is that the home mortgage
market has been integrated into the capital market, with correspond-
ingly lower mortgage rates. The increasing securitization of other types
of assets should produce similar results, with further mixed blessings for
depositories.
Commercial banks have increased their share of mortgages on
multifamily properties from 9 percent in 1980 to 12 percent in March
1992. The share accounted for by the shrinking savings and loan
industry declined from 27 percent to 19 percent, while the savings
banks’ share declined from 11 percent to 5 percent. Credit unions are not
active in this market. The share accounted for by mortgage pools
increased from 4 percent to 10 percent over the same period, with
government-sponsored enterprises accounting for a relatively stable 5
percent.
As regards commercial mortgages, commercial banks have in-
creased their share throughout the post-World War II period. In 1950
the share was 18 percent; it had increased to nearly 47 percent by
March 1992. Savings and loans increased their share from 18 percent in
1980 to 20 percent in 1985, but it then declined to 8 percent By March
1992. The share accounted for by savings banks has declined steadily
throughout the period, reaching 3 percent in March 1992. The share
for life insurance companies has remained relatively stable at about
30 percent.
Effect on Depositories" Portfolios
These changes in overall real estate lending by depositories have
meant corresponding changes in the importance of real estate mortgageDISCUSSION 139
lending within their portfolios. In particular, the percentage of savings
and loan assets devoted to home mortgage loans decreased from 67
percent in 1980 to a low of 41 percent in 1989, and this decline was not
offset fully by increases in mortgage-backed securities. Since then, a 6-
percentage-point gain in home mortgages has occurred, as many of
the more nontraditional institutions have failed and been turned over to
the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC). Overall, savings and loans held
77 percent of their assets in home mortgages and mortgage-backed
securities in 1980; this figure declined to 68 percent in March 1992 and
can be expected to decline still further with the recent loosening of the
Qualifying Thrift Lender test.
Commercial real estate mortgages rose from 6 percent of total
savings and loan assets in 1980 to 9 percent in 1985. The percentage
commitment remained high but tapered off slightly in 1986 and 1987,
then returned in 1992 to slightly below the level that had prevailed 10
years earlier. Construction and land development loans rose more
significantly, from 0.9 percent of total savings and loan assets in 1980 to
a high of 6 percent by 1987. By the beginning of 1990 the percentage had
dropped to 5 percent and then fell sharply, reaching 0.7 percent by early
1992. Multifamily mortgages remained a relatively steady percentage of
savings and loan assets throughout the period, with a slight increase in
the middle of the decade and again in 1991 and early 1992.
Reasons for the Shifts in Lending
The pattern of commercial real estate mortgage lending and con-
struction and land loans for savings and loans during the 1980s is
roughly consistent with changes in the laws and regulations. Following
the devastating interest-rate spread problems of the late 1970s and early
1980s, savings and loans responded to federal and state legislation
permitting lending and investment in commercial real estate. The
savings and loan institutions also responded to the increasing demand
for commercial real estate loans stimulated by federal tax changes in
1981 that encouraged investment in real estate. Greater involvement in
commercial real estate was viewed by many institutions as a way to
overcome the difficulties that had been created by funding fixed-rate
home mortgages with variable-rate liabilities, a situation brought about
in large part because savings and loans were not given authority to offer
adjustable-rate mortgages or to engage in futures transactions until after
the industry was economically insolvent.
By 1986 federal regulators began increasing capital requirements,
limiting direct investment in real estate (which in some cases had taken
the form of commercial real estate loans), and expressing concerns about
savings and loans’ commercial real estate loan activities. Also, federal140 James R. Barth
tax law changes in 1986 reversed much of the stimulus for real estate
investment provided in the 1981 law. The subsequent decline in savings
and loans’ lending for commercial real estate and construction and land
reflects these regulatory and legislative changes as well as the consid-
erable excess supply of commercial real estate.
In contrast to the savings and loans, commercial banks increased
their commitment to real estate in all forms throughout the 1980s and
generally even into early 1992. In addition to increased home mortgage
lending, including home equity loans, the commercial banks’ commer-
cial mortgage lending grew from 3 percent of total assets in 1980 to
slightly more than 7 percent in March 1992, with each percentage point
of increase now being applied to an asset base of $3.4 trillion. Construc-
tion and land loans rose from 2 percent to a high of 4 percent in 1989,
falling thereafter to nearly 3 percent by early 1992. Multifamily mort-
gages remained a relatively small though increasing percentage of
commercial bank assets throughout the period.
The massive shift of commercial bank assets in the 1980s into real
estate loans went largely unnoticed until late in the decade, in compar-
ison to the attention paid to savings and loans. Even late in the decade,
as Donald Hester notes, the industrywide shift toward real estate by
commercial banks continued, running counter to the negative effects on
real estate values of the 1986 tax law changes and the increasing vacancy
rates in most parts of the nation. Commercial banks also lengthened the
maturity of their commercial real estate loans during the 1980s. Con-
struction loans were extended into "miniperms" and some loans were
made without a commitment for permanent financing. Regulatory
inducements for such behavior were provided by the Garn-St Germain
Depository Institutions Act of 1982, which deleted the rigid statutory
limitations on the real estate lending authority of national banks in the
hope of encouraging more creative and flexible financing. Life insurance
companies experiencing real estate problems in recent years have had
difficulty providing the permanent financing for the maturing construc-
tion loans and miniperms at commercial banks. Only as late as 1990 and
1991 did the decline in the construction and land loan percentages and
the slowing growth in home mortgages indicate a tapering off in the
overall real estate loan growth at commercial banks.
The share of savings banks’ assets allocated to real estate lending
fell from 59 percent to 52 percent between 1980 and 1983, and then rose
to 60 percent by the end of the decade. In March 1992, about one-third
of the $236 billion total in savings bank assets was in commercial,
multifamily, and construction and development mortgage loans. In
addition to the credit unions’ substantial and increasing commitment of
nearly $230 billion in assets to home mortgages, their other real estate
loans rose from 5 percent of assets in 1986 to 9 percent in 1991.DISCUSSION 141
The Current Situation at Depositories
Many depositories now have substantial troubled (noncurrent and
foreclosed) real estate loans in their portfolios, whose weak condition
has been a drag on industrywide averages for several years, to the
dismay of the healthier institutions. In March 1992 commercial banks
had $68 billion, savings and loans $36 billion, and savings banks $13
billion in troubled real estate holdings; and in April 1992 the Resolution
Trust Corporation had $96 billion in receivership assets under its
management, of which $12 billion was in real estate owned and $7
billion in noncurrent loan construction and land loans. The highest
noncurrent rates at depositories occur in construction and land loans,
multifamily mortgage loans, and commercial mortgage loans.
Weakened real estate markets, risk-based capital requirements,
closer scrutiny of real estate loans by regulatory examiners, and now
the proposed limits on loan-to-appraised-value ratios (not to mention
overall sluggish economic growth) are inducing many depositories to
restructure their asset portfolios. In particular, the risk-based guide-
lines require savings and loans and banks to hold twice the capital per
dollar for commercial real estate loans that is required for qualifying
single-family mortgage loans, and five times the capital per dollar
for commercial real estate loans, relative to most mortgage-backed
securities.
In the first quarter of 1992, the average spread between short-term
and long-term yields on Treasury securities was 390 basis points (up
from 218 basis points a year earlier) and the average spread between
30-year fixed-rate mortgages and 30-year Treasury bonds was 75 basis
points (down from 139 basis points a year earlier). With 911 problem
commercial banks holding $463 billion in assets, commercial banks
understandably increased their holdings of U.S. government obligations
(non-mortgage) by $57 billion and their collaterized mortgage obliga-
tions by $37 billion, compared to the first quarter of 1991. At the same
time, all real estate lending increased by $16 billion and commercial and
industrial loans fell by $54 billion. Such portfolio changes are interpreted
by many as having created a credit crunch, thereby retarding economic
growth.
Where Do We Go from Here?
Most disturbing about the events of the recent financial past is the
fact that 4,350 federally insured depository institutions failed from 1980
through 1991, with combined assets totaling more than $580 billion and
collective costs to resolve the failures exceeding $150 billion. Some argue
that the policies of the Federal Reserve to combat inflation in the late
1970s helped destroy the savings and loans, and that the Fed’s more142 James R. Barth
recent policies to stimulate the economy helped the banks. Others argue
that depository institutions gambled with federally insured deposits--
the moral hazard problem. Still others argue that managers of deposi-
tory institutions pursued their own interests, which included an em-
phasis on sheer size, even when profits suffered--the agency problem.
Add fraud and mismanagement, exogenous financial innovations, tax
and regulatory factors, regional and macroeconomic shocks, and greater
domestic and international competition, and one has relatively little
difficulty explaining what happened to depository institutions and their
involvement in real estate during the past decade. But weighing the
relative contribution of each factor is extremely difficult, as Hester
indicates.
Despite all the difficulties and challenges confronting depository
institutions, even they do not agree as to where we go from here. At
year end 1991, the 87 percent of all savings and loans that were under
$500 million in size held 25 percent of total industry assets; the 95
percent of banks that were of similar size also held 25 percent of their
industry’s total assets. These institutions disagree over what the legally
permissible banking and branching choices across state borders should
be. Moreover, not only do depository institutions differ among them-
selves but they also differ with securities and insurance firms as to
whether depositories should be permitted to offer products and services
in these areas, even as inroads are increasingly being made through
limited authority granted by states and the Federal Reserve. Interest-
ingly enough, depositories in several other countries have already been
granted such broader authority.
Meanwhile, telecommunications and computers continue to slash
information and transaction costs. As these developments occur, one
must question the tradition of viewing and therefore regulating depos-
itories as separate and distinct financial service firms, serving narrowly
circumscribed geographical areas and owned by a limited class of
entities. Indeed, it is time to let healthy depositories, with the demon-
strated ability to measure, manage, and price risk, compete more fully
rather than continually subjecting them to the enforceable guesses of
regulators as to which specific menu of products and services ade-
quately protects taxpayers in an ever-changing global marketplace. At
the same time, it is incumbent upon regulators to remove unhealthy
institutions promptly and cost-effectively from an already overcrowded
financial services industry. This requires careful monitoring, since the
interest rate risks and credit risks for depositories are asymmetric and
nonlinear, insofar as good earnings on assets typically range from 70 to
100 basis points, while losses on assets have recently averaged from 10
to 45 percent.DISCUSSION 143
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Donald Hester has presented an incisive paper on the impact of the
recent real estate collapse on financial intermediaries. He first discusses
the reasons why major lenders moved so far into the mortgage markets
during the 1980s. His analysis summarizes the history of the mortgage
markets that led up to the most recent decade; the reasons for the
involvement of the three principal private sector intermediaries~com-
mercial banks, savings and loans (and savings banks), and life insurance
companies--in the mortgage markets; and the warning signs that
became evident during the 1980s. Finally, he offers solutions to the
problems the intermediaries now confront. Overall, I agree with most of
Hester’s observations, analyses, and conclusions regarding the mort-
gage market and its participants. These comments will briefly summa-
rize some key sections of his presentation, in particular the areas where
I disagree with him and the areas that I believe were underemphasized.
Expanded Real Estate Lending
The essence of Hester’s paper, and the reason we are gathered here
today, lies within his section titled Explanations for Changing Mortgage
Lending by Intermediaries. Here he hypothesizes as to why each type of
intermediary entered the real estate mortgage market. I will focus most
of my attention on the commercial banks, but will first discuss briefly the
thrifts and the life insurance companies.
Hester argues that, as a result of the interest rate problems the thrift
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industry experienced in the early 1980s, many thrifts expanded aggres-
sively into the real estate mortgage markets; I agree with this entirely.
The expansion into the mortgage markets led eventually to significant
losses for the industry and subsequent failures of hundreds of thrifts.
Excluding failures attributed to fraud, embezzlement, and the like, it is
important to note that many of the thrift failures reported in the 1980s
were the direct result of aggressive growth in commercial real estate
lending, particularly in the construction and development markets.
Residential mortgage lending was not a significant factor in causing
thrift failures, in my opinion. I should also point out that the thrift
failures I refer to are those in New England.
An example to support this statement is the failure of the Maine
Savings Bank. This bank was a traditional thrift, established in 1859 as
the Portland Five Cents Savings Bank. It survived the Civil War, World
War I, the Great Depression, and World War II, but was unable to
survive the real estate boom-to-bust cycle of the 1980s. The bank failed
on February 1, 1991. Its demise began in the mid 1980s as it aggressively
expanded its commercial real estate lending, particularly in construction
and development. From 1984 to 1988 (the peak in the company’s loan
portfolio), commercial mortgages grew from $151.1 million or 13.7
percent of total assets to $714.8 million or 27.9 percent of total assets.
Construction loans expanded from $54.9 million or 5.0 percent of total
assets to $450.9 million or 17.6 percent. Residential mortgages grew
from $351.3 million or 32 percent oftotal assets to $671.1 million, but as
a percentage of assets they declined to 26 percent. In 1984 commercial
real estate and construction loans represented 150 percent and 54.5
percent, respectively, of shareholders’ equity. In 1988 they represented
715 percent and 297 percent of shareholders’ equity. By year end 1990,
the company charged off close to $175.0 million in its commercial real
estate portfolio; this eliminated the company’s net worth.1
The implication of Hester’s hypothesis is that all real estate lending
led to the thrift crisis. I would suggest that the primary problem leading
to the failure of hundreds of thrifts and banks in the 1980s was
aggressive commercial real estate lending, not residential lending.
I accept Hester’s hypothesis regarding the life insurance industry’s
change in the asset side of its balance sheet. The industry moved into
more liquid assets because of the changing nature of its liabilities. I
would add the following: the increased competition from the thrifts and
commercial banks for commercial mortgages may also have influenced
the life insurance companies’ ability to attract mortgage loans. As the
competition intensified, life insurance companies were unable or unwill-
These financial data are taken from the company’s annual reports, 1985 to 1990.146 Gerard S. Cassidy
ing to compete on the terms the market was dictating and were forced
to invest in other, more liquid securities.
Hester offers three explanations for the aggressive increase in
mortgages outstanding for the commercial banking industry. First, the
capital markets have provided numerous financial derivatives such as
interest rate swaps, options, and futures that banks can utilize to
immunize themselves against interest rate risk. Additionally, the advent
of the adjustable rate mortgage has given banks increased flexibility to
hold loans in their portfolios rather than sell them in the secondary
market. As a result of these changes and options, banks have been more
willing to retain mortgages, which has led to the greater exposure to the
real estate mortgage market.
Second, changes in the tax-deductibility of interest expense have
encouraged borrowers to use mortgage financing (home equity loans)
for multiple purposes. This has led to an increased demand for mort-
gage loans.
Third, changes in the loan markets that banks serve have made it
likely that banks would have greater expected profits if they increased
the percentage of their loan portfolios in real estate loans. As Hester
points out, however, this argument is difficult to support because
bankers rarely announce the rates of return they realize. I would suggest
that the average yields on a selected group of assets, say, commercial
mortgages, could be used as a method of measuring potential rate of
return. Hester also argues that increased competition from foreign
banks conducting business in the United States, and the growing
commercial paper market, have taken away banks’ lucrative commercial
and industrial loan business. It is this area I will expand upon.
Nonbank Competitors of Banks
The banking industry has seen a significant increase in competition
from nonbank competitors over the past 30 years. The nonbank compe-
tition has an advantage over the banking industry in two areas, cost and
revenue opportunities. Nonbank competitors do not have to deal with
the higher costs associated with the banking business, empirical or
anecdotal. Empirically, deposit insurance premiums have steadily in-
creased over the past two and one-half years from $0.12 per $100 in
deposits to $0.254 per $100 in deposits, effective January 1993. Banks
also are required to keep upwards of 10 percent of their net transaction
accounts on reserve at the Federal Reserve in non-interest-bearing
accounts. Finally, the Community Reinvestment Act forces banks to
accept loans from borrowers that may not meet the banks’ underwriting
standards and may have a higher degree of potential for loss. Nonbank
competitors are not restricted by any regulatory agency that determinesDISCUSSION 147
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which businesses are acceptable. Even more important, nonbank com-
panies are expanding aggressively into lucrative banking products such
as credit cards.
Perhaps the most important financial event of the past 30 years has
been the development of the commercial paper market (Figure 1). I
believe the development of this market has been the primary reason for
bank expansion into riskier loan areas. With the development of this
market, the banking industry’s primary customers-~Fortune 500 com-
panies--have been able to bypass the banking industry for their primary
borrowing needs. Expansion into the commercial real estate market was
needed to offset the loss of this commercial and industrial loan business.
I believe that encroachment on the banks’ most profitable busi-
nesses by nonbank competitors will continue to affect banks adversely.
Merrill Lynch is a good example of a nonbank competitor that operates
in many traditional bank markets. Today, Merrill Lynch offers money
market savings accounts that include a credit card and check writing
privileges. The company also originates small business loans and home
mortgages. Ranked by its money market deposits, which are estimated
to be over $60 billion, Merrill Lynch would be the fourth largest bank in
the United States. Thus, nonbank competition and the development Of
the commercial paper markets are two primary reasons why banks have
been forced to increase their exposure to commercial real estate markets.148 Gerard S. Cassidy
Other Economic Factors
In his section titled Problems in Real Estate Markets and Scenarios for
Resolution, Hester mentioned that problems in the residential and
commercial real estate markets were evident throughout the 1980s,
which should have alerted lenders and regulators that borrowers of
commercial mortgages would have trouble meeting their obligations. I
concur with many of the hypotheses presented; however, regional
economic cycles also have to be considered when interpreting the
growth of commercial real estate mortgages. Second, many of the
financial intermediaries did not have adequate systems in place to
monitor their loan portfolios. Finally, the use of interest reserves in
commercial real estate lending disguised the true performance of com-
mercial mortgage portfolios.
Hester discusses the impact that demographic shifts and falling
home prices will have on residential real estate delinquencies. He cites
Mankiw and Weil (1989) and Garner (1992), who hypothesize that these
trends are likely to deteriorate in the future and should lead to lower
residential real estate prices. Hester believes that a significant rise in
home mortgage delinquencies is not likely to occur as long as the
residential property is not over-leveraged. I agree, but would also add
that as long as the homeowner is employed, the probability of default is
low. Lower home prices would prevent the homeowner from trading up
to a larger, more expensive house (assuming the current value of the
home is below the amount the owner paid) rather than cause massive
numbers of defaults on home mortgages.
Hester presents data supplied by the National Council of Real
Estate Investment Fiduciaries (NCREIF) that measure the return on
commercial real estate from 1979 to 1992. The capital rate of return has
been negative from 1987 through 1992. The income rate of return has
been positive every year in the time period covered. He also presents the
national downtown vacancy rates, as compiled by CB Commercial Real
Estate Group, Inc. from 1979 to 1992. The deterioration in vacancy rates
has been dramatic, rising from 3.4 percent in March 1980 to 18.8 percent
in March 1992. These two indices suggest that aggressive lending into
the commercial real estate markets was misguided.
Why did the banking industry expand so aggressively into the
commercial real estate markets? First, as indicated earlier, the rapid
growth of the commercial paper market forced the banking industry to
look for new areas of lending. Second, a generation of bankers grew up
with the misperception that commercial real estate prices rarely decline.
The REIT crisis in the early 1970s suggested otherwise, but most
commercial loan officers either were in high school at the time or had
short memories. Lending against commercial real estate was considered
less risky than unsecured commercial and industrial lending because theDISCUSSION 149
lender had collateral supporting the loan. Third, the high inflation rates
of the late 1970s and early 1980s added tonic to the rising values of
commercial real estate.
Fourth, regional economic growth encouraged increased commer-
cial real estate lending. Two vivid examples were Texas and New
England. In my discussions with bankers in both regions during the
periods of rapid economic growth, bankers held the attitude that their
regions were recession-proof. In Texas, the common refrain was "The
economy is recession-proof because of the oil industry." In New
England five years later, the refrain was "New England is not another
Texas because the economy is more diversified than the Texas econo-
my." Obviously both of these statements proved to be untrue.
Fifth, underwriting standards were eased to boost bank competi-
"Well~ it sure looks like Texas~ and yet..."
Drawing by Ziegler; © 1990 The New Yorker Magazine, Inc.150 Gerard S. Cassidy
tiveness. Sixth, the banking industry was not equipped to handle the
rapid growth in loan portfolios. The banks were unable to maintain
adequate control over the loan review process, and in some cases a bank
had no independent loan review function. Finally, the creation of
interest reserves disguised the true performance of the commercial loan
portfolio. Interest reserves typically were established at the time the
commercial real estate loan was originated, to carry the developer
through construction and into the first two years of lease-up. Although
the loan was current the building may not have been generating cash
flow adequate to cover debt service. In such cases, the cash flow
shortfall was offset by the interest reserve. Furthermore, developers
would divert cash flow from other properties to keep the loan current.
Conclusion
In offering solutions to problems in the commercial real estate
market, Hester suggests that excess capacity will be absorbed over time
by an expanding economy. In the event the financial system cannot
sustain the losses created by real estate problems, a taxpayer bailout
may be required. The transfer of ownership to large pension funds and
other trusts would assist in the recovery. However, large losses would
be incurred by the lending institution that had the original loan. Finally,
a restructuring of the financial markets, together with an ongoing
reduction in the number of financial institutions, may improve the
profitability of the survivors.
I agree with the author’s solutions, painful though they are. In fact,
I agree with nearly all of his work, but I would place greater emphasis
on the impact that deregulation of the capital markets had on the
banking industry. I believe that the deregulation of the capital markets
was the primary catalyst in forcing commercial banks to expand rapidly
into commercial real estate lending.